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You, your neurons, and free will:
Concerns about reductionism and 
the popularization of cognitive 
science
Imagine yourself lying on your back 
in a narrow tube. Your head is com-
fortably restrained, your ears plugged 
against the incessant banging of the 
machinery surrounding you. You 
are in a magnetic resonance imag-
ing machine, and your brain is being 
scanned. Your task is to lie quietly 
and watch a stream of letters that, 
one after another, appear on a screen 
suspended before your eyes. Every half 
second, a new letter appears. You have 
been instructed that, at a time of your 
choosing, you should freely decide 
to press one of two buttons that lie 
beneath your left and right index fin-
gers, and that you should then do so 
immediately. After about 20 seconds, 
if you are a typical research subject, 
you make that decision, and freely 
press a button. 
As soon as you have pressed the 
button, the screen in front of you 
changes, and you see the last three let-
ters that appeared before you pressed 
the button. This is no surprise — the 
researchers told you that this would 
happen, and that you should indicate 
which of the letters was being dis-
played when you decided what but-
ton to press. Most of the time, you 
indicate that you decided what button 
to press about a second before you 
carried out your freely-chosen action. 
The task is simple; the choices are 
easy. The experimenters thank you at 
the end for your contribution of time 
to the study of free choice.
But all is not well, at least where 
your free choices are concerned. The 
researchers have been analyzing your 
data1, and they have discovered that 
they are able to predict which but-
ton you will press by examining 
local changes in blood flow seven 
seconds before the button press. The 
researchers can also predict when you 
will press the button based on local 
increases in blood flow about five 
seconds before you press the button. 
And so, seconds before you reported 
your decision, there were signals in 
your brain that indicated what and 
when you would make that decision. 
The implication: your brain decided 
what you would do long before any 
conscious urge.
This is not the only study to show 
this. An experiment conducted by 
Benjamin Libet and his colleagues in 
the 1980s2 suggested that a brain wave 
thought to be a precursor of action 
(the readiness potential) preceded a 
hand movement by as much as a sec-
ond, while estimates of the urge to act 
only preceded the hand movement by 
about half a second. In fact, over the 
last 30 years, the basic patterns of the 
Libet experiment have been replicated 
a number of times.3 And so it is that 
neuroscientists, cognitive scientists, 
and philosophers are settling on the 
conclusion — even dogma4 — that 
free will and consciousness are illu-
sions.
This conclusion flies in the face 
of what most people believe about 
themselves. An illusory free will calls 
by Karl G.D. Bailey Along with a longstanding Adventist 
commitment to the development of 
the whole person, as well as to the 
development of character through 
effortful practice, the Adventist position 
on human nature has much to offer 
cognitive science and the public at large, 
especially given the current state of 
popular cognitive science.
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into question the intents of educa-
tion, of democracy, of law, of religious 
belief, and of a Christ who began His 
ministry with a call to repent — to 
literally rethink your thinking. When 
presented with the arguments for the 
illusion of the will under laboratory 
conditions, moral decision-making 
suffers,5 raising the possibility that the 
perceived truth about the illusion of 
free will threatens society itself. And 
yet this view of conscious free will as 
an illusion is being popularized on 
bestseller lists,6 in national newspa-
pers,7 and in highly-respected scientific 
journals.8 All is, indeed, not well.
The speed at which popular cogni-
tive science9 has arrived at the conclu-
sion that free will must be an illusion 
is troubling. While the problem of free 
choice has often been discussed with 
respect to determinism (the claim that 
all events have prior causes),10 I will be 
examining the relationship between 
the claims of popular cognitive science 
and reductionism. 
Reducing the mind to nothing 
(but neurons)
Reductionism is the view that phe-
nomena at a given level of analysis 
can be explained in their entirety by 
phenomena at an underlying level of 
analysis. In this case, mental experi-
ences (psychological phenomena) are 
being reduced to the firing of neurons 
(biological phenomena). Despite — or 
perhaps because of — the simplicity 
of this idea, reductionism is part and 
parcel of the claim that free choice is 
an illusion. If choices can be reduced 
to nothing but neural activity in a 
particular environmental context, and 
the neural activity and environmen-
tal context can be measured, then 
all future decisions for a person can 
be known. Of course, this assumes a 
relatively simple view of reality, where 
all causation is from simpler to more 
complex events and phenomena, but 
the explanation, in its simplicity, is 
intuitive. Indeed, although there is lit-
tle evidence that reductionism results 
in the best explanations in science,11 
reductionist thinking is being increas-
ingly applied to the question of what 
it means to be human. For example, 
men and women have been reduced to 
purported differences in brain struc-
ture12 (the corpus callosum is often 
blamed), even after those differences 
have been shown to be an artifact of 
publication bias and misinterpretation 
of single studies by talk-show hosts.13 
Love, in all its many splendored 
forms, has been reduced to blood-level 
concentrations of neurotransmitters 
and hormones,14 glossing over other, 
more-troubling studies that implicate 
the same chemicals in envy, gloating, 
and in-group bias.15 Such reductionism 
should be of great concern to Seventh-
day Adventist Christians, because 
one of our core beliefs about human 
nature is that human beings are an 
indivisible integration of mind, body, 
and spirit — without any one of these, 
the human self cannot exist16 (this is 
known as holism). Indeed, unlike the 
majority of Christians,17 Adventists are 
(or should be) materialists — we do 
not appeal to a dualism of body and 
soul in this life, after death, or in the 
life to come. In this, Adventists are 
consistent with modern cognitive  
science. But, unlike increasingly- 
common popularizations of cognitive 
science in the press, popular culture, 
and even scientists’ public comments, 
Adventists cannot condone the reduc-
tion of the human person to “nothing 
but a pack of neurons.”18 
These concerns are not new. In 
1893, Ellen White preached a sermon19 
on the dangers of popular phrenology 
— the belief that the mind could be 
reduced to the structure of the brain 
and thereby read from bumps on the 
head — in which she spoke force-
fully against popularizations of the 
cognitive science and psychology of 
her time (to wit, popular phrenology). 
In her sermon, she told the story of a 
Brother Butler, who was convinced by 
a phrenologist that he lacked the brain 
area for faith and thus was a hope-
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less case. When Brother Butler began 
to preach the gospel at White’s (and 
the Holy Spirit’s) insistence, he found 
that the hollow in his head filled in. 
(It was likely never there — modern 
attempts to replicate phrenological 
readings have shown that the reading 
was a function of the phrenologist’s 
intentions and expectations.20) White 
concludes that phrenology offers no 
hope for change — but God does.
It is worth noting that the popular 
phrenology of Ellen White’s day pro-
vided the language that everyone used 
to talk about the mind — we still talk 
about people needing to have their 
heads examined, or about having hol-
low heads, both echoes of our phre-
nological past — and the language of 
popular cognitive science plays a simi-
lar role today. Indeed, the current state 
of popular brain science in self-help 
and purported “brain-based” books is 
no better than the popular phrenology 
that Ellen White spoke against in the 
late 19th century. Scott Lilienfeld, a 
psychologist who has studied popular 
understandings of psychology and 
neuroscience, reports that only 5 per-
cent of popularized works are based 
on any empirical study at all.21 Indeed, 
most “brain-based” learning strate-
gies and products are based on what 
Sashank Varma, Bruce McCandliss, 
and Daniel Schwartz refer to bluntly 
as “neuromyth”22 in their comprehen-
sive 2008 review of the relationship 
between cognitive neuroscience and 
“brain-based” education; these myths 
have become pervasive in the 21st cen-
tury.23
Neuromyths and well-lit brains
Neuromyths are created through 
what Eric Racine, Ofek Bar-Ilan, and 
Judy Illes refer to as neurorealism and 
neuroessentialism.24 Neurorealism 
occurs when brain imaging is used 
in order to decide what is real — it 
reduces the mind (and spirit) onto the 
brain, describes people as nothing but 
their brain processes, and interprets 
correlations between brain activity 
lighting up,”29 people, even those with 
some training in neuroscience, accept 
those claims uncritically — even if 
they would otherwise be very critical 
of the same statements without the 
brain-based content. 
The only people to critique appro-
priately “brain-based” claims in the 
Weisberg study were professional neu-
roscientists with extensive experience 
in thinking critically about the design 
and interpretation of brain-imaging 
studies. It was not sufficient to have 
merely taken classes in neuroscience; 
an interest in and familiarity with 
neuroscience made readers more apt, if 
anything, to accept poor arguments in 
the face of the mention of the brain. 
While these studies have recently been 
challenged,30 they are consistent with 
longstanding evidence that people 
tend to accept empty statements in 
place of explanations as long as they 
have the right form — that is, unless 
habits of mindful, critical thinking are 
present.31 Training such critical think-
ing skills requires time, practice, and 
effort;32 nevertheless, such training is 
at the core of what we desire when we 
talk about the integration of faith and 
learning.33
Along with a longstanding Adventist 
commitment to the development of 
the whole person, as well as to the 
development of character through 
effortful practice, the Adventist posi-
tion on human nature has much to 
offer cognitive science and the public 
at large, especially given the current 
state of popular cognitive science. As 
we integrate a position that finds bal-
ance between eliminating free will and 
over-committing to self-sufficiency, 
we can provide a model that makes 
sense of the wealth of data about 
human nature discovered in the last 
few decades. In so doing, we can pro-
mote a view of human persons that 
neither excessively excuses nor blames 
individuals through reductionism. 
Several lines of evidence pointing 
toward the role of effort in human 
development,34 the efficacy of prayer 
and certain tasks as evidence for nor-
mative human behaviors. An example 
of neurorealism would be a descrip-
tion of love as nothing but chemicals 
in the brain.25 In neurorealism, any 
aspect of mental life that cannot be 
(or has not been) imaged does not 
exist. Neuroessentialism involves mak-
ing the brain into the self; again, the 
self is reduced into the brain, this 
time in order to describe people as 
they supposedly really are. Because 
neuroscience involves trying to under-
stand the dysfunction of the brain as 
well as the function of the brain, this 
often leads to describing normal brain 
function using the language of pathol-
ogy and illness — as when love is 
described as nothing but an addiction. 
Neurorealism and neuroessentialism 
are especially incompatible with an 
Adventist approach to human nature. 
To begin with, holism and reduction-
ism are incompatible; moreover, if we 
believe in restoring human beings to 
the image of God, we cannot describe 
normal brain functions primarily in 
terms of pathology (if God is love, can 
love be an addiction?). Neuromyths 
are also a problem, because they dis-
rupt our interactions with individuals 
and communities. If the poor and 
prisoners can be reduced to dysfunc-
tional “packs of neurons,” why clothe 
or visit them; if our sins were prede-
termined by our brains, why try to 
repent or forgive?
So what can we conclude from this? 
Should Adventists shun anything to 
do with the popularization of cogni-
tive science? I would suggest that we 
take Ellen White’s advice — given 
in 1884 — seriously: “Be guarded 
on every hand.”26 Adventists must 
think critically about the modern 
science of the mind. This will not 
be an easy task. Separate studies by 
Deena Skolnick Weisberg and her col-
leagues,27 and by David McCabe and 
Alan Castel28 demonstrate that when 
unsupported claims about the mind 
are presented in the context of pictures 
or even mere mention of a “brain 
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for changing religious experience,35 the 
role of practicing self-control in prepa-
ration for future resilience,36 and, in 
my lab, work showing the importance 
of internalization of Sabbath-keeping 
for human well-being all suggest that 
a wholistic, developmental approach 
to human nature — such as that held 
by the Seventh-day Adventist Church 
— holds more promise for the task of 
making humans whole than the illu-
sion of reductionism.
Karl G.D. Bailey (Ph.D., Michigan 
State University) is a professor of 
the Behavioral Sciences Department 
at Andrews University, Berrien 
Springs, Michigan, U.S.A.).  
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